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EXAMINING DiDONATO'S DAMAGE LIMITATIONS
AND MANDATORY JOINDER REQUIREMENTS -
Greer v. Parsons
INTRODUCTION
In the landmark decision DiDonato v. Wortman,1 the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that a viable2 fetus is a "person"
within the purview of the state's wrongful death statute.3 As a re-
sult of this decision, a plaintiff can successfully maintain a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a stillborn child.4 However, the
court barred recovery for pecuniary loss5 and loss of society and
companionship, damages which are expressly available under the
wrongful death statute.' The court reasoned that since a fetus' in-
1. 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489, reh'g denied, 320 N.C. 799, 361 S.E.2d 73
.(1987).
2. Viability is normally defined as the ability of the fetus to maintain life
outside of the mother's body. T. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOVERY IN
THE 90s 302 (1990).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1991). The DiDonato court stated, "A viable
fetus ... is by definition capable of life independent of its mother. [It] is geneti-
cally complete and can be taxonomically distinguished from non-human life
forms." DiDonato at 427, 358 S.E.2d at 491-92.
4. Jim Hutcherson, Note, North Carolina Recognizes Cause of Action for the
Wrongful Death of a Viable Fetus: DiDonato v. Wortman, 23 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 849 (1988).
5. For the purposes of this Note, pecuniary losses will refer only to lost
income.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1991). North Carolina's Wrongful Death
Act provides in pertinent part:
(b) Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act include:
(1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to the injury
resulting in death;
(2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent;
(3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent;
(4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to
receive the damages recovered, including but not limited to compensation for loss
of the reasonably expected:
(a) Net income of the decedent,
(b) Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent, whether volun-
tary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to
the damages recovered
(c) Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of
1
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telligence, personality, and abilities cannot be determined, recov-
ery for such damages would be based on "sheer speculation."
7
DiDonato also adopted a mandatory joinder requiremerit'
Under this requirement, an action for the wrongful death of a via-
ble fetus must be joined with any action based on the same facts
brought by the decedent's parents.9 The court adopted the joinder
requirement to protect a defendant from possibly paying punitive
damages to the parents in both actions.'0 In most instances, since
the parents, in addition to having their own claim, are the real par-
ents of interest in the wrongful death action, the court feared par-
ents might possibly receive a double recovery of punitive dam-
ages. 1 The court reasoned that allowing such a result would in
effect punish a defendant twice for a single act of negligence.
12
Greer v. Parsons13 is the first North Carolina Supreme Court
application of DiDonato. In Greer, the court again faced the ques-
tion of whether damages for pecuniary loss and loss of society and
companionship could be recovered in an action for the wrongful
death of a viable fetus. In upholding DiDonato's damage limita-
tions, the court again noted that "an award of damages covering
these kinds of losses would necessarily be based on speculation
rather than reason."1 4 Thus, Greer "declined plaintiff's invitation
to revisit [DiDonato].' 5
However, the Greer court bypassed DiDonato's joinder re-
quirement, and allowed the claim for punitive damages to be
brought even though it was not joined with the parents' personal
injury claims.' 6 The court noted that the parents settled their
the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages recovered;
(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had he sur-
vived, and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of the decedent
through maliciousness, wilful or wanton injury, or gross negligence;
(6) Nominal damages when the jury so finds.
7. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 431, 358 S.E.2d at 492 (1987) (quoting Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 489 (1966)).
8. Id. at 434, 358 S.E.2d at 495.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 331 N.C. 368, 416 S.E.2d 174 (1992).
14. Id. at 374, 416 S.E.2d at 177 (quoting DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C.
423, 432, 358 S.E.2d 489, 494).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 373, 416 S.E.2d at 176.
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claims prior to the filing of the DiDonato decision.1 7 As a result,
the court held that "it was impossible for plaintiff to anticipate
and comply with the mandatory joinder requirement."'" Hence,
the court, noting that other methods could be used to prevent
double recovery, declined to apply the joinder requirement.1 9
This Note will outline the evolution of wrongful death actions,
with particular attention being given to the inclusion of unborn
children under the providing statutes. It also traces North Caro-
lina's legislative and judicial treatment of wrongful death actions.
Next, the Note will discuss the inconsistencies created by ruling
that pecuniary loss and loss of society and companionship cannot
be recovered as a matter of law in a wrongful death action brought
on behalf of viable fetus. It will argue that instead ,of limiting re-
covery as a matter of law, such damages should be addressed on a
case-by-case basis and the question of whether damages are too
speculative should be answered by the trial court. The Note con-
cludes by addressing the consequences of Greer's decision to disre-
gard DiDonato's mandatory joinder requirement. It suggests that
although Greer provides an exception to the joinder requirement,
it is unclear exactly how broad (or narrow) that exception is.
THE CASE
On October 19, 1986, Brenda and Danny Greer were seriously
injured in an automobile accident involving their car and one oper-
ated by defendant Bynum Parsons."° At the time of the accident,
Mrs. Greer was eight-and-a-half months pregnant, and the acci-
dent resulted in the death of her unborn child, Kandy Greer."
On April 8, 1987, two months prior to the filing of DiDonato,
the Greers settled their claims against the defendants." On July
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant: (1) drove
across the centerline and into the path of plaintiff's automobile, (2) was careless
and reckless in operating his vehicle, (3) drove at an excessive speed, (4) failed to
keep a proper lookout, and (5) was under the influence of an impairing substance.
See Complaint at 4, Greer v. Parsons, 331 N.C. 368, 416 S.E.2d 174 (1992) (No.
334PA91).
21. Greer, 331 N.C. at 370, 416 S.E.2d at 175.
22. Id. As part of the settlement, the Greers signed a release "[for them-
selves, their] heirs, personal representatives, and assigns." The release discharged
defendants "from any and all claims, demands, damages, costs, expenses, loss of
19921
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28, 1988, Mrs. Greer qualified as administratrix of Kandy Greer's
estate, and subsequently filed a wrongful death claim, seeking com-
pensatory and punitive damages on behalf of the deceased.23 The
plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages included claims for pe-
cuniary loss and loss of companionship. 4 Relying on DiDonato, the
trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
with respect to the plaintiff's claim for these damages.2 5 In addi-
tion, the trial court, noting plaintiff's failure to comply with
DiDonato's mandatory joinder requirement, granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment with respect to the punitive dam-
ages claim.2"
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment with respect to the punitive damages
claim." The court held that it would be a "pointless absurdity" to
require the parents to join their defunct claim with the wrongful
death claim.28 In addition, the court stated that the only purpose
of DiDonato's joinder requirement was "to facilitate the fair litiga-
tion of two claims for punitive damages that are based upon the
same act or event."2 9 The court continued by noting that "when
services, actions and causes of actions" for any injuries, present or future, stem-
ming from the accident. Id. The effect of this release was an issue raised in Greer,
however it is an issue beyond the scope of this note. Briefly, however, the court
ruled that the release did not bar the wrongful death action since the plaintiff
"had no authority to settle the wrongful death claim of the fetus prior to qualify-
ing as administratrix, and the release operated only to discharge defendant's lia-
bility to the signers thereof." Id. at 372, 416 S.E.2d at 176.
23. Id. Note that Mrs. Greer was named administratrii almost two year after
the date of loss. Since North Carolina did not allow recovery for the wrongful
death of a viable fetus until the DiDonato decision in 1987, there was no estate
(i.e., tort claim) to oversee at the time of the loss. Note also that according to
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 89 N.C. App. 154, 365 S.E.2d
909 (1988), aff'd, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990), an action to recover for the
destruction of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere could be applied retroactively to
an action commenced before DiDonato was decided. Finally note that Mrs. Greer
brought this action just prior to the running of the two-year statute of limitation
for wrongful death actions. See High v. Broadnax, 271 N.C. 313, 156 S.E.2d 282
(1967), overruled on other grounds, Bockweg v. Anderson, 328 N.C. 436, 402
S.E.2d 627 (1991).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Greer v. Parson, 103 N.C. App. 463, 467, 405 S.E.2d 921, 924 (1991), aff'd,
331 N.C. 368, 416 S.E.2d 174 (1992).
28. Id. at 468, 405 S.E.2d at 924.
29. Id. at 467, 405 S.E.2d at 924.
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only one claim is being or can be litigated, there is nothing to
join." 30 The court concluded that a defendant's right not to be as-
sessed punitive damages twice could be protected simply by al-
lowing the defendant to introduce evidence showing that part of
the parents' settlement included punitive damages." Thus, the
court disregarded DiDonato's joinder requirement and allowed the
plaintiff to present a claim for punitive damages.32 However, not-
ing its deference to the state's .Supreme Court, the Court of Ap-
peals reluctantly affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment with respect to damages for pecuniary loss and loss of
companionship. 3
3
On discretionary review, the North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision.34 With respect to plain-
tiff's claim for punitive damages, the supreme court disregarded
the mandatory joinder requirement because of the impossibility of
joining the claims.35 However, with respect to the claim for pecuni-
ary damages and damages for loss of companionship, the court re-
iterated that "an award of damages covering these kinds of losses
would necessarily be based on speculation rather than reason. "36
Hence, the Greer court "decline[d] plaintiff's invitation to revise
[DiDonato's] holding. ' '13
BACKGROUND
In Baker v. Bolton,38 Lord Ellenborough established the com-
mon law rule barring recovery for the negligently-caused death of
another. In that decision, the court prohibited recovery because
"the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
injury. '39 It was not until the passage of Lord Campbell's Act in
30. Id.
31. Id. at 468, 405 S.E.2d at 924.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Greer v. Parsons, 331 N.C. 368, 374, 416 S.E.2d 174, 175 (1992).
35. Id. at 373, 416 S.E.2d 176.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 374, 416 S.E.2d at 175.
38. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808) (denying a husband's claim for
the wrongful death of his wife which occurred when defendants' stagecoach over-
turned). See also Broadnax v. Broadnax, 160 N.C. 432, 76 S.E. 216 (1912) (recog-
nizing no right of action for wrongful death at common law).
39. Id.
1992]
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184640 that a cause of action for wrongful death was finally recog-
nized."1 In 1855, North Carolina passed its first wrongful death
statute,42 which, like most other jurisdiction, modeled Lord Camp-
bell's Act.4
3
Despite the enactment of wrongful death statutes, all states
continued to treat an unborn child as an entity inseparable from
its mother.4 4 As a result, a child could not maintain an action for
injuries occurring before its birth.' 5 This "single entity" view was
exemplified in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton.4 6 In Die-
trich, the court held that an unborn child was still considered part
of the mother and, therefore, was not a separate being in its own
right.4 7 As a result, the court concluded the defendant could not
owe a duty of conduct to a person who was not in existence at the
time of the action.4
However, in what Prosser deemed "the most spectacular ab-
40. Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93.
41. 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:2, at 5-7 (2d ed. 1975).
Lord Campbell's Act provided that "whenever the death of any person is caused
by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another, in such a manner as would
have entitled the party injured to have sued had death not ensued, an action may
be maintained if brought within twelve (12) months after his death in the name of
his executor or administrator for the benefit of certain relatives."
42. N.C. GEN STAT. § 39 (1855).
43. See Killian v. Southern Ry. Co., 128 N.C. 261, 38 S.E. 873 (1901).
44. S. SPEISER, supra note 41, at 29. Note, the North Carolina Supreme Court
did not address the issue until Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531
(1968).
45. See, e.g., Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108
So. 566 (1926); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184I11. 359, 56 N.E.2d 638 (1900)
(denying recovery where a full-term unborn child was seriously and permanently
disabled by a malfunctioning elevator in the hospital just prior to its delivery);
Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United
Ry. Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J. 455, 26 A.2d
489 (1942); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Berlin v. J.C.
Penny Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A.
704 (1901); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d
944 (1935); Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916
(1916).
46. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884) (denying recovery for infant who
died within 15 minutes of birth from injuries sustained when its mother slipped
on a negligently maintained highway during between the fourth and fifth months
of her pregnancy). See generally William T. Muse & Nicholas A. Spinella, Right
of Infant to Recover for Prenatal Injury, 36 VA. L. REV. 611 (1950).
47. Id.
48. Id.
[Vol. 15:97
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rupt reversal of a well-settled rule in the whole history of the law
of torts,"'49 the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia in Bonbrest v. Ketz6" became the first court to allow recov-
ery for prenatal injuries. In Bonbrest, the court rejected the "single
entity" view and conditioned recovery on the child's being born
alive.51 The court held that because the fetus was viable at the
time it sustained injury, its rights deserved legal protection.5 2 To-
day, all American jurisdictions allow a surviving child to recover
damages for prenatal injuries.6 3
49. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 336 (4th ed. 1971).
50. Bonbrest v. Ketz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (recovery allowed when a
viable fetus survived for only a brief period because of injuries sustained during
removal from its mother's womb).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. S. SPEISER, supra note 41, § 4:33, at 180-82. Today, in an action to re-
cover for prenatal injuries, a majority of jurisdictions have rejected the viability
standard, and have held that when a child is born alive, he/she is considered a
legal person to whom a duty of care could be owed from the-moment of concep-
tion. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So. 758 (1973); Simon v. Mullin,
34 Conn. Supp. 139, 380 A.2d 1353 (1977); Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328
So. 2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co.,
212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d
691 (1961); Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. (1980); Torigian v.
Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 466, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967); Womack v. Buch-
horn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 2189 (1971); Bergsteser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22
(8th Cir. 1978) (Missouri); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 438, 147 A.2d 108 (1958);
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D.
542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483
F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) (Oklahoma); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93
(1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966); Delgado v. Yandell,
468 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 471 S.W.2d 569 (1971);
Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959). However,
many jurisdictions have retained the viability standard for determining whether a
child may recover for injuries sustained en ventre sa mere. See Bonbrest v. Kotz,
65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1945); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d
678 (1939), aff'd per curiam, 33 Cal. 2d 629, 93 P.2d 562 (1939); Worgan v. Greggo
& Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App.
487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962);
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md.
417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838
(1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); White v. Yup, 85
Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital, 95 N.M. 105, 619
P.2d 826 (1980); Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968); Wil-
liams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 144, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949); Libbee v.
Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974), aff'd, 269 Or. 543, 525 P.2d
1992]
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Three years later in Verkennes v. Corneia,5 Minnesota be-
came the first state to recognize an action for the death of a viable,
but unborn child. Relying on Bonbrest, the Minnesota Supreme
Court emphasized "that where independent existence is possible
and life is destroyed through a wrongful act, a cause of action
arises." 55 Thus, the court held the fetus was entitled to protection
under the state's wrongful death statute.
In Gay v. Thompson,5 7 North Carolina first confronted the is-
sue of whether the state's wrongful death statute allowed recovery
for the death of a viable child en ventre sa mere.5 8 At the time of
the Gay decision, North Carolina's wrongful death statute allowed
recovery of "such damages as are a fair and just compensation for
the pecuniary losses resulting from the death." 59 In light of this
statute, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that "negligence
1296 (1974); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960); Shousha v.
Matthews Drivurself Serv., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962); Vaillancourt v.
Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 217, 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank
v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va.
431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971).
54. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (father of the unborn alleged that a
negligently-supervised delivery resulted in the death of viable fetus and its
mother).
55. Id. at 370-71, 38 N.W.2d at 841. In condemning the no duty rule, the
Verkennes court seemingly adopted the view that "an unborn child in the path of
an automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother, and should be
equally protected under the law." Winfield, The Unborn Child, 4 U. TORONTO
L.J. 278 (1942).
56. Id. Today, in jurisdictions which recognize an action for the wrongful
death of a fetus, viability is a "prerequisite in determining whether a fetus ac-
quires a legal identity which warrants the protections and remedies of the legal
system." Comment, The Right of Recovery for the Tortious Death of the Unborn,
27 How. L.J. 1649, 1660 (1984).
57. 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966) (eight-month-old fetus and its
mother died when doctor negligently attempted to induce premature delivery).
58. Id. En ventre sa mere is defined as "in its mother's womb." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 534 (6th ed. 1990).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-173, 28-174 (1966). Pecuniary injury was deter-
mined by deducting the probable cost of the decedent's living expenses from his
probably gross income during the years he would have been expected to live had
it not been for the wrongful act of the defendant. Purnell v. Rockingham R.R.
Co., 190 N.C. 573, 130 S.E.2d 313 (1925). See also Armentrout v. Hughes, 247
N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1958) (recovery under state's wrongful death statute is
limited to pecuniary injury; it does not provide for punitive damages or nominal
damages in the absence of pecuniary loss); Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727,
142 S.E.2d 585 (1965) (state's wrongful death statute leave no room for sentiment,
it confers a right to compensation only for pecuniary loss).
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alone, 'without pecuniary injury resulting from such death,' does
not create a cause of action.""0 Thus, the court declined to recog-
nize an action for the wrongful death of a fetus, stating that it was
"virtually impossible to predict whether an unborn child, but for
its death, would have been capable of giving pecuniary benefit to
anyone.""1
Two years later, in Stetson v. Easterling," the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that a child who lived for only a few months
could recover for prenatal injuries. However, the Stetson court, re-
lying on Gay, refused to allow damages for the child's wrongful
death.63 The court noted that since the state's wrongful death stat-
ute confined recovery to pecuniary losses, "it would be 'sheer spec-
ulation' to assess damages as of the time of the negligently inflicted
injuries."64 Thus, under Gay and Stetson, North Carolina refused
to recognize an action against one who inflicts fatal injuries on a
fetus, regardless of whether the fetus was born dead or alive.
In 1969, the General Assembly rewrote the damages section of
the state's Wrongful Death Act. 5 The revised damage section pro-
vided compensation for the following:
(1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to
the injury resulting in death;
(2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent;
(3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent;
(4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons
entitled to receive the damages recovered, including but not lim-
ited to compensation for loss of the reasonably expected:
(a) Net income of the decedent;
(b) Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent,
whether voluntary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to the
damages recovered;
60. Gay, 266 N.C. at 398, 146 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting Hoke v. Atlantic Grey-
hound Corp., 266 N.C. 332, 38 S.E.2d 105 (1946)).
61. Id.
62. 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968) (denying wrongful death action, but
allowing recovery for prenatal injuries when the child lived for only a few months
before dying from brain damages negligently inflicted while en ventre sa mere).
See also Stain v. State, 47 N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980), afl'd, 302 N.C.
357, 275 S.E.2d 439 (1981) (live birth requirement is a condition precedent to
exercise property rights acquired by unborn child).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 156-57, 161 S.E.2d at 534.
65. Act approved April 14, 1969, ch. 215, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 194 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (supp. 1987)).
1992]
9
McCabe: Examining DiDonato's Damage Limitations and Mandatory Joinder Req
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
(c) Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and
advice of the decedent to the personsentitled to the damages
recovered;
(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered
had he survived, and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the
death of the decedent through maliciousness, wilful or wanton in-
jury, or gross negligence;
(6) Nominal damages when the jury so finds.6
Since damages were no longer limited to "speculative" pecuni-
ary losses, the revisions effectively removed the primary obstacle
which had previously blocked recovery for a viable fetus.
Prior to DiDonato, the North Carolina Court of Appeals twice
addressed whether an unborn child fell within the purview of the
state's revised wrongful death statute. In Cardwell v. Welch, 7 the
court held that the wrongful death statute applied only to "one
who by live birth had attained a recognized individual identity."68
One year later, the Court of Appeals addressed the same issue in
Yow v. Nance."9 In affirming its decision in Cardwell, the court
again denied recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus stating that
a child still in its mother's womb was not a "person" under the
Wrongful Death Act.7 0
Almost twenty-one years after Gay, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court in DiDonato v. Wortman7 1 finally readdressed the is-
sue of whether a viable fetus could maintain a wrongful death ac-
tion. In overruling Cardwell and Yow, Chief Justice Exum noted
that almost every state, including North Carolina, allowed children
to recover for fetal injuries.7 2 The court stated that as a matter of
consistency and logic, the wrongful death statute should be ex-
tended to protect viable, unborn children.7 3 Chief Justice Exum
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b).
67. 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382 (1975).
68. Id. at 392, 213 S.E.2d at 383.
69. 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, disc. rev. denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225
S.E.2d 833 (1976).
70. Id.
71. 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
72. DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 427, 358 S.E.2d 489,491 (1987). See
also, Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968) (a child can re-
covery for injuries negligently inflicted upon him while within the womb).
73. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 427, 358 S.E.2d at 491. A commonly-used hypo-
thetical illustrating the potential inconsistencies supposes that twins are negli-
gently injured while in their mother's womb. The injuries result in the death of
one child, but the other survives. Commentators have argued that it would be
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reasoned that denying this action would allow a tortfeasor to es-
cape liability for the death of a fetus, but would hold a tortfeasor
liable when he only injures a fetus. 4 As one court noted, failing to
include a viable fetus within the protections of a state's wrongful
death statute "would only serve the tortfeasor by rewarding him
for his severity in inflicting the injury."75 Noting the possibility of
such unjust results, the DiDonato court concluded that a viable
fetus is within the class of "persons" contemplated by the wrongful
death statute.76
In reconciling DiDonato with its prior holding in Gay, the
North Carolina Supreme Court focused on the 1969 amendments
to the wrongful death statute.7 The DiDonato court held that
since damages were no longer limited to "speculative" pecuniary
losses, a fetus is entitled to compensation for damages which can
be "precisely calculated. 7'8 These damages included, medical and
funeral expenses, as well as, nominal and punitive damages.7 9
With respect to punitive damages claims, the court held, "The
plaintiff's claim for the wrongful death of a viable fetus must be
joined with any claims based on the same acts of alleged negligence
brought by the parents in their own right."80 The court noted that
"wrongful death actions are permitted not for the benefit of the
decedent, but to compensate the decedent's survivors."'" Thus,
since the parents are the real party of interest in the wrongful
inequitable to allow only the surviving child to recover. See, e.g., Espadero v.
Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480 (D.C. 1986); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969) ("It would be arbitrary and illogical to hold
the distributees of an injured fetus which survives birth by a few minutes may
have a recovery while those of a stillborn fetus may not.").
74. Id.
75. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974) (action
for the death of an eight-and-a-half month old fetus may be maintained under the
wrongful death statute regardless of whether death from fetal injury occurred
before or after live birth).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 429-30, 358 S.E.2d at 492-93. Recall that the 1969 amendments
allowed recovery for the following: lost income; compensation for the decedent's
medical and funeral expenses; decedent's pain and suffering; and loss of the dece-
dent's services, protection, care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guid-
ance, kindly offices, and advice. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1991).
78. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 428, 358 S.E.2d at 492-93.
79. Id. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
80. Id. at 434, 358 S.E.2d at 495.
81. Id. at 433, 358 S.E.2d at 495 (citing In re Ives Estate, 248 N.C. 176, 102
S.E.2d 807 (1958)).
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death action, the joinder requirement was adopted to protect a de-
fendant from having to pay punitive damages to the parents in
both actions.2
However, despite recognizing that damages in a wrongful
death are to some extent uncertain and speculative, the court pro-
hibited recovery for pecuniary loss, as well as loss of society and
companionship." The court, stating that it needed to draw a line
between relatively speculative and unreasonably speculative dam-
ages, held that since a stillborn's intelligence, abilities, and inter-
ests cannot be determined, a jury attempting to calculate such
damages would be reduced to "sheer speculation." '84 Hence,
DiDonato in effect held that although a viable fetus is a "person"
under the Wrongful Death Act, a plaintiff is precluded as a matter
of law from recovering some of the damages specifically provided
under the Act.8 5
ANALYSIS
A. Greer's Upholding of DiDonato's Damage Limitations
1. The basic inconsistencies created by precluding damages
as a matter of law
Greer v. Parsons86 is the first case to challenge DiDonato's
damage limitations. In that case, the North Carolina Supreme
Court reiterated that in an action for a fetus' wrongful death, pe-
cuniary damages and damages for loss of companionship would
necessarily be based on "sheer speculation" since the child's abili-
ties and personality could not be determined at the time of its
death.8 7 Thus, the court upheld its ruling in DiDonato that an
award of such losses would be based on speculation and not
reason.
88
Greer's upholding of limited damages in wrongful death action
82. Id. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 431-32, 358 S.E.2d at 492.
85. Id. In DiDonato, the court was not convinced that a fetus' pain and suf-
fering could ever be satisfactorily proven. The court, however, did not want to
preclude such recovery as a matter of law. As a result, pain and suffering damages
were held to be recoverable if they could be established with reasonable certainty.
86. 331 N.C. 368, 416 S.E.2d 174.
87. Id. at 374, 416 S.E.2d at 177 (quoting DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C.
423, 432, 358 S.E.2d 489, 494 (1987)).88. Id.
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12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss1/5
DAMAGE LIMITATIONS
brought on behalf of a viable fetus preserves the inconsistencies
created by DiDonato. DiDonato expressly states that a viable fetus
is a "person" under the Wrongful Death Act. 9 The Wrongful
Death Act, in turn, explicitly allows "persons" coming under its
purview to recover certain enumerated damages.90 These damages
include compensation for the expected net income of the decedent;
services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent; and soci-
ety, companionship, and advice. 1 Yet, despite this clear allowance
of damages, the DiDonato and Greer courts held that such losses
are not recoverable. As Judge Phillips noted in writing the Court
of Appeals opinion in Greer, precluding these damages creates an
inconsistency because it "prevents parents from trying to prove
damages that the act expressly authorizes in all cases under it."92
In essence, DiDonato and Greer have "legislated" an outcome
contrary to the intent of the General Assembly.93 In Beck v. Caro-
lina Power & Light Co.,94 the North Carolina Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the "legislative intent of the wrongful death statute
was to compensate persons as fully as possible for the loss of the
decedent."9 5 Further, the specific listing of these damages clearly
indicates the. legislature's intent to allow for broad recoveries. 6
Yet, by an act of "judicial fiat," the Court has barred plaintiffs as a
matter of law from being fully compensated.9 7 As Justice Martin
noted in his dissent in DiDonato, "It is not the prerogative of this
Court to usurp a legislative function by rewriting the statute to
change the rule of damages."98 Justice Webb expounded on this
notion by stating, "If there are to be wrongful death claims for
unborn persons, the plaintiffs should- have whatever damages they
may prove under the Wrongful Death Act."99
89. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 430, 358 S.E.2d at 495.
90. N.C. GEN.. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1991).
91. Id.
92. Greer, 103 N.C. App. 463, 468, 405 S.E.2d 931, 924 (1991), aff'd, 331 N.C.
368 (1992).
93. Brief for Plaintiff Appellant at 5, Greer v. Parsons, 331 N.C. 368, 416
S.E.2d 174 (1991) (No. 334PA91).
, 94. 57 N.C. App. 373; 291 S.E.2d 897, aff'd, 307 N.C. 267, 297 S.E.2d 397
(1982).
95. Id.
96. DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 436-37, 358 S.E.2d 489, 496-97
(Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Id. at 438, 358 S:E.2d at 497 (Webb, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 437, 358 S.E.2d at 497.
99. Id. at 438, 358 S.E.2d at 497.
1992]
13
McCabe: Examining DiDonato's Damage Limitations and Mandatory Joinder Req
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
In attempting to justify the damage limitations, DiDonato and
Greer contend that jurors would be reduced to using "sheer specu-
lation" in awarding damages for lost income and loss of compan-
ionship in cases involving a viable fetus. °10 However, as one court
noted, "the mere difficulty of proving a fact is not a very good rea-
son for blocking all attempts to prove it."'' By stating as a matter
of law that the plaintiff cannot attempt to prove these types of
damages, DiDonato and Greer not only deny plaintiffs the full
benefit of the statute, but also yield unjust results. In order to fully
understand how DiDonato and Greer deprive plaintiffs of the full
benefits of the statute, it is necessary to individually consider the
preclusion of (1) loss of income damages and (2) loss of society and
companionship.
2. The preclusion of lost income damages
DiDonato creates a basic inconsistency with the state's wrong-
ful death statute by ruling that pecuniary damages were specula-
tive as a matter of law in cases involving a viable fetus. Admit-
tedly, determining a fetus' intelligence, industry, and ability is a
most difficult challenge. However, by holding that such damages
could be determined only by sheer speculation, the court failed to
note that other jurisdictions have awarded lost income damages in
wrongful death action brought on behalf of a viable fetus.'1 2 For
example, in Pehrson v. Kistner,13 the Minnesota Supreme Court
awarded pecuniary losses based on testimony suggesting that the
decedent would have been expected to assist in the operations of
its family's dairy farm. In O'Neil v. Morse,04 the Michigan Su-
100. Greer v. Parsons, 331 N.C. 368, 374, 416 S.E.2d 174, 177 (1992);
DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 432, 358 S.E.2d 489, 494 (1987).
101. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
102. The following cases have allowed recovery of pecuniary loss in a wrong-
ful death action brought on behalf of for a viable fetus: Espadero v. Feld, 649 F.
Supp. 1480 (D.C. 1986) (granting recovery for the wrongful death of a nine-
month-old fetus under statute interpreted as limiting revere to net pecuniary
loss); Jones v. Karraker, 109 Ill. App. 3d 363, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1982); Rice v.
Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. App. 1970); O'Neil v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188
N.W.2d 785 (1971); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222 N.W.2d 334 (1974).
103. 301 Minn. 299, 222 N.W.2d 334 (1974). Under Minnesota statute, recov-
ery for wrongful death is "the amount the jury deems fair and just in reference to
the pecuniary loss resulting from the death." MINN. STAT. § 573.02(1) (1973).
104. 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971). In discussing whether a viable
fetus was a "person" under Michigan's wrongful death statute, the court posed
the following question: "Widely reported was the March 20, 1971, birth of one
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preme Court allowed recovery for loss of services despite acknowl-
edging that such damages are difficult to prove in the case of an
infant or stillborn child."0 5 The O'Neil court ruled that the parents
were entitled to these damages because the statute expressly pro-
vided for such compensation. 10 6 The awarding of these damages in-
dicates pecuniary damages are not necessarily based on specula-
tion. In addition, these decisions show the feasibility of calculating
pecuniary loss. As noted in Rice v. Rizk,' 7 lack of proof does not
preclude recovery because "there is an inference that the child
would have had some earning power. '"108
Further, as one court noted, "It is difficult to visualize a case
where a human being does not have some monetary value."10 9
Common sense indicates that in the majority of cases, a child will
eventually have some earning capacity. 10 Such potential should be
recognized and compensated accordingly when it is wrongfully pre-
empted. However, the Greer and DiDonato decisions bar consider-
ation of these damages as a matter of law. As a result, plaintiffs in
North Carolina cannot even attempt to present a claim for pecuni-
ary loss. In order to remain consistent with the statute's expressed
Kimberly Sue Bange, found alive and in good condition some distance from the
body of her mother, killed in a fatal automobile accident. Termed 'a Cesarean
section by violence,' the event . . . establishes a useful hypothetical case; suppose
Kimberly Sue had also been found dead. How many 'persons' would have died in
the crash? How many wrongful deaths?" Id. at 137, 188 N.W.2d at 787.
105. Id. at 138, 188 N.W.2d at 788.
106. Id. In pertinent part, the Michigan wrongful death statute provides:
(2) Every such action shall be brought by... the personal representatives of such
deceased person, and every such action the court or jury, shall deem fair and just,
with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death, to those persons
who may be entitled to such damages when recovered and also damages for the
reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses for which the estate is
liable and reasonable compensation for the pain and suffering, while conscious,
undergone by such deceased person during the period intervening between the
time of the inflicting-of such injuries and his death. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922
(West 1965).
107. 453 S.W.2d 732 (1970).
108. Id. at 735.
109. Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222 N.W.2d 334 (1974).
110. Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. App. 1970). See also National Ass'n of
Educ. Progress, Earning and Learning (1990) (54% of eleventh grade students
held part-time jobs); Amy Callahan, Teens Begin Quest for Summer Work; Im-
proved Prospects Reported, But Youths Won't Take Just Any Job, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, June 4, 1989, at 1 (normal teen-age unemployment rate is 11.7% in
Massachusetts).
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provisions and the legislature's intent, pecuniary losses should be
addressed on a case-by-case basis."'
3. The preclusion of damages for loss of society and
companionship
Perhaps more troublesome than the preclusion of pecuniary
damages is the denial of damages for loss of society and compan-
ionship. In both DiDonato and Greer, the North Carolina Supreme
Court states, "When a child is stillborn we simply cannot know
anything about its personality and other traits relevant to what
kind of companion it might have been."' 12 In writing the Court of
Appeals opinion in Greer, Judge Phillips noted that DiDonato was
too broad in holding a child's loss of companionship is based en-
tirely on personality.1 3 Although the child's personality may affect
the parent-child relationship in the later years of childhood, com-
panionship will surely occur during the early years. 4 As Judge
Phillips noted, a "unique and treasured companionship" exists be-
tween parents and their younger children.' 1 5
Further, in holding that damages for loss of companionship
could only be calculated by sheer speculation, the court pessimisti-
cally inferred that it assumes a negative parent-child relationship
will develop."' However, this is contrary to the average house-
hold.1 1 7 Although there will certainly be rough times in the rearing
of a child, most parents establish fulfilling relationships with their
children."18 Even if the rough times outnumber the easy times,
111. DiDonato at 436, 358 S.E.2d 489 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743
(1986)).
112. Greer v. Parsons, 331 N.C. 368, 373-74, 416 S.E.2d 174, 177 (1992);
DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 432, 358 S.E.2d 489, 496. (1987).
113. Greer v. Parsons. 103 N.C. App. 463, 468, 405 S.E.2d 921, 924 (1991),
aff'd, 331 N.C. 368 (1992).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Greer v. Parsons, 331 N.C. 368, 374, 416 S.E.2d 174, 177 (1992).
117. In a recent study by the National Commission on Children, the follow-
ing statistics were cited as indicating a strong sense of family togetherness: (1)
70% of parents play a game or sport with their children at least once a week; and
(2) 70% of parents report eating dinner together as a family five or more nights a
week. National Comm'n on Children, Speaking of Kids: A National Survey of
Children and Parents (1992).
118. According to the same study, 65% of parents rate their relationship with
their children age 17 and younger as "excellent;" and 32% rate their relationship
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"kinship in enduring and a parent's bond with its offspring does
not vanish when the child's personality becomes displeasing or its
character disappointing." ."9
Besides failing to consider companionship in the early stages
of childhood and the enduring companionship maintained
throughout life, the DiDonato and Greer courts also failed to ac-
knowledge that jurors' life experiences will assist them in assessing
the loss of a child's society and companionship. As Judge Phillips
concluded:
[Flor a jury to conclude that any normal parent would have en-
joyed cuddling, looking after, playing with and training his or her
child regardless of its characteristics would not be "sheer specula-
tion;" instead it would be a rational determination based upon
[the jury's] knowledge of human experience and the law of
probabilities. 2 '
The purpose of damages in a wrongful death case is to restore
the beneficiaries to the position they would have occupied had
there been no death. 2 ' When there has been a wrongful death of a
viable fetus, the parents are deprived of the expected benefits of
having that child. These benefits surely include loss of companion-
ship and loss income. However, DiDonato and Greer, have pre-
cluded this damages as a matter of law. As one commentator
noted, the limited damages are "vastly inadequate to the estate of
a child who had a right to life and to pursue a full life. 122 Justice
Webb expounded upon this notion by stating, "If there are to be
.wrongful death claims for unborn persons, the plaintiffs should
have whatever damages they may prove under the wrongful act. 11 2 3
Even if such damages may initially appear speculative, plaintiffs
should at least have the opportunity to prove otherwise. However,
under Greer and DiDonato, a plaintiff cannot even have his day in
court with respect to these damages.
as "good.'. National Comm'n on Children, supra note 117.
119. Greer v. Parsons. 103 N.C. App. 463, 468, 405 S.E.2d 921, 924 (1991).
120. Id.
121. Scallon v. Hooper, 58 N.C. App. 551, 293 S.E.2d 843, cert. denied, 306
N.C. 744, 295 S.E.2d 480 (1982).
122. Christopher P. Edwards, Note, DiDonato v. Wortman and Wrongful
Death of a Viable Fetus in North Carolina: The Case Against Unreasonably Re-
stricting Damages, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1291 (1988).
123. DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 438, 358 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1987).
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B. Greer's Bypassing of DiDonato's Mandatory Joinder
Requirement
With respect to punitive damages claims, the DiDonato court
held, "The plaintiff's claim for the wrongful death of a viable fetus
must be joined with any claims based on the same acts of alleged
negligence brought by the parents in their own right."' 24 Noting
that the parents are the real party of interest in the wrongful
death action, the court adopted this joinder requirement to protect
a defendant from having to pay punitive damages to the parents in
both actions.'25
In justifying the joinder requirement, the court relied on Nich-
olson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, Inc.'26 In Nicholson,
the court recognized a spouse's right to maintain a cause of action
for loss of consortium. 27 Prior to Nicholson, loss of consortium ac-
tions were not recognized for a variety of reasons, including fear of
double recovery. 28 In addressing this fear, the Nicholson court
held double recovery could be avoided by "compel[ling] joinder of
one spouse's action for loss of consortium with the other spouse's
action for personal injury."' 29 In addition, the court stated, "Not
only does joinder avoid the problem of double recovery, it recog-
nizes that, in a very real sense, the injury involved is to the mar-
riage as an entity."130
In adopting its joinder requirement, DiDonato court stated,
"This case is like Nicholson . . . in -that the family unit allegedly
has been injured by a single negligent act or course of conduct."'' 3'
The court noted that punitive damages are available in both the
124. Id. at 434, 358 S.E.2d at 495.
125. Id. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
126. 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
127. Id.
128. In Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925),
the North Carolina Supreme Court gave the following reasons for not allowing
recovery for loss of consortium: (1) historically the wife had no action for consor-
tium; (2) consortium included a predominant factor of service and that any at-
tempt to separate that service element from society, companionship, and affection
was impossible; (3) the wife's damages were too remote a consequence of a de-
fendant's negligent injury of her husband to have been proximately caused by
that injury; and (4) to allow a wife's action for loss of consortium, particularly
when the main component of that action was compensation for lost service, would
allow double recovery.
129. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 303, 266 S.E.2d at 823.
130. Id.
131. DiDonato, at 433, 358 S.E.2d at 495.
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wrongful death action and the parents' personal injury suit. 3 2 The
DiDonato court concluded, "If the actions [were] tried separately,
defendants could be punished twice for a single act of negli-
gence."'1 33 As a result, the court adopted a mandatory joinder re-
quirement to prevent the parents from "reap[ing] a windfall not
contemplated by the legislature when it permitted actions for
wrongful death.1 1
34
In Greer, the plaintiffs settled their claim prior to the filing of
DiDonato.'33 In fact, Mrs. Greer did not qualify as administratrix
until one year after DiDonato.'36 The North Carolina Supreme
Court held, "[I]t was impossible for plaintiff to anticipate and
comply with the mandatory joinder requirement announced in
DiDonato, and we decline to apply that requirement to this
case." 37 The court concluded:
In cases such as this ... defendants' right not to be assessed with
punitive damages that have already been paid can be protected in
another, simpler way. If they allege that part of the moneys the
parents received in settlement of their claims was for punitive
damages, defendants would have a right. . . to support that con-
tention with evidence and have the jury consider it in evaluating
the Administratrix's claim for punitive damages, if that claim
goes to the jury. "8
Thus, as a result of Greer, failure to comply with DiDonato's
mandatory joinder requirement does not necessarily bar a claim for
punitive damages. Greer, in effect, has carved out an exception to
DiDonato. However, the extent of this exception is uncertain.
Greer stated that DiDonato's mandatory joinder requirement
would not apply "in cases such as this."' 39 The facts in Greer, how-
ever, present two possible interpretations for when the mandatory
joinder requirement may be disregarded. One interpretation is that
the joinder requirement will not apply in any situation where the
parents have settled their claims prior to bringing the wrongful
death action. Such an interpretation would appear consistent with
132. Id. at 434, 385 S.E.2d at 495.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Greer, 331 N.C. at 373, 416 S.E.2d at 176.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Greer v. Parson, 103 N.C. App. 463, 467, 405 S.E.2d 921,
924 (1991)).
139. Id.
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the Court of Appeals statement that "DiDonato does not forbid
the settlement of claims, joinable or otherwise."14 A more narrow
interpretation of Greer, however, would be that the joinder re-
quirement will not apply only when settlement occurred prior to
DiDonato. The Greer court based its decision on the fact that it
was impossible for the plaintiffs "to anticipate and comply with
the mandatory joinder requirement."1 In any settlement occur-
ring after DiDonato, it is no longer impossible for plaintiffs to an-
ticipate and comply with the joinder requirement. Hence, under
this narrow interpretation, failure to comply with the joinder re-
quirement may bar claims for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
In upholding DiDonato's preclusion of certain damages, Greer
preserved the inconsistencies created when the court extended the
rights and protections afforded by the wrongful death statute, but
then limited the damages expressly provided in the act. Relying on
DiDonato, Greer held that as a matter of law a plaintiff is barred
from pursuing a claim for pecuniary loss and loss of companion-
ship. The court itself has recognized that damages in any wrongful
death action are to some extent uncertain and speculative. '42 How-
ever, in cases involving a viable fetus, the court has held that some
damages are automatically reduced to the point of preclusion. The
problem with this approach is that it does not allow a plaintiff to
bring these claims to court, even though the legislature has ex-
pressly permitted such actions by those coming under the statute's
provisions. In order to alleviate such inconsistencies, these dam-
ages should not be precluded as a matter of law. Instead, plaintiffs
should be able to present their claim and support it with any avail-
able evidence. After presenting such evidence, if the trial judge
finds that the damages would be too speculative, then he can sim-
ply remove that claim from jury consideration.
In examining DiDonato's mandatory joinder requirement, the
Greer decision provides an avenue by which plaintiffs may bring
claims for punitive damages without complying with the joinder
requirement. However, extent of this exception is unclear. The
facts of Greer yield two possible interpretations. A broad reading
of Greer would hold that the joinder requirement will not apply
140. Greer, 103 N.C. App.'at 467, 405 S.E.2d at 924.
141. Greer, 331 N.C. at 373, 416 S.E.2d at 176.
142. DiDonato, at 431, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
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whenever the parents settle their claims prior to bring the wrong-
ful death action. However, a more narrow reading would hold that
plaintiffs may bringing an action for punitive damages only when
they could not anticipate and comply with joinder requirement. In
essence, under this narrow interpretation, one may bypass the join-
der requirement only when the parents have settled their claims
prior to DiDonato. Hence, although Greer broadened DiDonato's
holding with respect to punitive damages, it remains unclear ex-
actly how broad the Greer rule is.
John M. McCabe
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